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I. INTRODUCTION 
Affirmative action is once more the subject of heated discussion in the United States. 
Its legitimacy and merits are currently being revisited, and the participation of the 
Bush administration in the debate on race and equality has dramatically raised the 
visibility of yet other forms of affirmative action currently under scrutiny before the 
U.S. Supreme Court. [FN1] Meanwhile its lesser-known European relative, positive 
action, is experiencing, without much fanfare, a significant breakthrough in E.U. law. 
[FN2] 
Positive action shares the logic of affirmative action. Both allow for preferential 
treatment of certain groups to make up for historical wrongs or traditional 
discrimination against them. However, in European circles, positive action is perceived 
as much more in tune with the principle of individual equality than its American 
counterpart. [FN3] In E.U. jargon, affirmative action is often used as a disparaging 
label to refer to a wide range of practices, including "hard" measures of intervention, 
designed to reach fixed quotas of minority representation in education and the 
workforce. Positive action, arguably, does not go that far because it consists of "soft" 
measures only. These measures avoid explicit quotas and preserve meritocracy. 
Arguably, they can be more easily defended as consonant with equality principles. It is 
commonly argued that, through such policies, European governments only help 
marginalized groups to enter the game, promising them a fair chance but no certain 
victory. As illustrated in this Article, the distinction between positive and affirmative 
action is difficult to maintain in practice and does not rest on firm theoretical grounds. 
However, the contrast is very popular in E.U. equality discourse, and allows for the 
survival of group-oriented redistributive policies under the label of positive action even 
in circles dominated by traditional equality rhetoric. [FN4] 
Positive action's newfound salience in E.U. policies and governance lies in a recent and 
dramatic expansion of its scope. Until recently, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, or 
"the Court") could only address positive action policies concerning gender inequality. 
Recent treaty reforms, however, have added race, ethnicity, and religion as meaningful 
categories of identity within the scope of the E.C. Treaty. [FN5] Two E.C. directives 
currently being implemented allow member states to enact positive action measures in 
favor of racial, ethnic, and religious groups. [FN6] As a consequence, the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ may now extend far enough to include review of such measures. [FN7] 
The reform is a welcome step forward in the Union's pursuit of a healthier society. It 
signals legislative awareness of serious disharmonies due to the diversity of peoples on 
European soil. The acknowledgment of positive action as a permissible (though not 
mandated) tool of social engineering against the range of discriminatory practices is 
also welcome, and likely to weather the arguments of formal equality advocates. Yet 
the reform carries a non-obvious but fundamental drawback. The future development 
of positive action in favor of ethnic, racial, or religious groups is unambiguously linked 
to its gender-based origins. The positive action clauses of the new directives are 
modeled upon earlier provisions meant to redress sex discrimination. In all likelihood, 
the ECJ will interpret such terms along the lines of its previous scrutiny of gender 
programs. [FN8] This is, however, a chapter of E.U. history that should not be written. 
A close analysis of the ECJ's decisions on positive action in favor of women casts 
serious doubt on the wisdom of extending that court's equality paradigm to matters of 
race, ethnicity, or religion. While written in the reassuringly nuanced language of 
proportionality, these decisions impose strict limits upon the member states' abilities to 
devise appropriate anti- discrimination measures according to local needs and state-
based perceptions of social justice. Anchored as it is to a rigidly individualistic 
conception of rights, the Court lacks both conceptual and institutional tools to embrace 
complex issues of collective justice in diverse societies. [FN9] 
Against the specter of this judicial development, this Article advocates a policy of 
restraint in the supranational scrutiny of positive action cases. The multifarious 
socioeconomic and cultural problems posed by the coexistence of multiple identities 
within the European constituency cannot be solved by means of uniform, E.U.-wide 
solutions. Nor can supranational scrutiny of positive action, based as it is on rights and 
centralized enforcement, do justice to the diverse legal and political sensibilities of 
national and subnational decision- makers. Positive action is a form of wealth 
redistribution, to be placed along a continuum of fiscal, economic, and social measures 
still within the sovereign control of member states, and not adequately captured by the 
equality paradigm so far applied by the ECJ. The Court should continue to ensure, 
through its individual rights jurisprudence, the protection of minorities against negative 
discrimination, but it should allow for broader state autonomy in the experimentation 
of positive-discrimination formulae designed to benefit marginalized groups. Positive 
action plans enacted by member states are now broadly endorsed by the new 
directives, and are therefore presumptively legitimate. Such plans should only be 
subject to the scrutiny of national courts, which are better equipped than the ECJ to 
determine a balance of equal rights and redistributive policies according to local 
context, culture, and welfare philosophy. 
An E.U.-wide coordination of states' policies meant to combat the social exclusion of 
minorities should be achieved, when necessary, through alternative forms of European 
governance involving incentive measures and non- binding guidelines. 
This argument develops through four analytical steps. Part II articulates a critique of 
the ECJ's positive action case law, based on the Court's over- reliance on the 
prescriptive power of its equality paradigm, and on the uncertain boundary between 
states and Community competencies in matters of social legislation. [FN10] Part III 
highlights the coexistence, in the law of the Union, of a strong commitment to 
individual rights on the one hand, and numerous recognitions of identity-based 
collective claims on the other. Affirmative action, in both soft and hard modes, can be 
conceived of as one among many existing forms of allocation of resources in favor of 
identity- defined groups, legitimized by the political consensus of the relevant 
constituency, rather than as an exceptional derogation from the canon of individual 
equality and blind justice. Part IV provides state-based examples of ongoing identity-
based redistribution, sharing the essence, if not the form, of affirmative action. These 
illustrations show how measures targeting ethnic or religious groups for redistributive 
purposes are not uncommon in both national and supranational policies. They are 
natural adaptations of welfare state policies to the diversity of social landscapes. The 
dominant rhetoric of identity-blind justice fails to capture such realities and thwarts the 
debate on the problems of a multicultural Europe. Part V offers specific technical 
grounds for the argument that the ECJ should not review positive action policies 
enacted by member states. The several prohibitions of discrimination in the E.C. Treaty 
do not provide an appropriate treatment of the complex theme of positive action. The 
subject finds better analogues in other treaty provisions that deal more directly with 
the true scope of positive action-- namely, the fight against social exclusion--and that 
open up alternative avenues for an E.U.-wide dialogue on the rehabilitation of 
marginalized collective identities. [FN11] 
This Article contributes to the broader discussion on the ongoing evolution of European 
constitutionalism. Scholars have emphasized the chasm between the "classic" method 
of supranational lawmaking and new, emerging forms of European governance. [FN12] 
The Classic Community Method reproduces, at a supranational level, the member 
states' modernist tradition, anxious about legitimacy, constitutionalism, and 
fundamental rights. [FN13] The new modes of European governance rely instead on 
grass-roots deliberation and enhanced political dialogue. My contribution to that 
discussion lies in dispelling a few myths surrounding the modernist tradition. If 
examined closely, mainstream policies at both national and European levels already 
embrace techniques for accommodating identity-based claims that a conventional 
rights discourse is incapable of capturing. [FN14] Addressing discrimination and 
exclusion by policies that combine justiciable individual rights with softer but effective 
forms of social inclusion is not a revolutionary move brought about by the new 
mechanisms of European governance, but rather a step in line with common practice 
and tradition, placed along a continuum of plausible institutional choices. 
II. GROUPS IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: GENDER 
AS A 
START 
Due to the limited competencies of the European Community, gender has been the 
only context in which the ECJ has reviewed state measures of positive action. Gender 
is, therefore, the necessary starting point of this discussion. This Part discusses a 
number of ECJ decisions on positive action in favor of women. The discussion highlights 
the elements of the Court's equality paradigm: positive action is a derogation from 
individual rights, to be justified in light of legitimate state goals. The Court itself is in 
charge of determining which state goals are legitimate, and to what extent states' 
positive action measures are proportionate to such goals. The analysis then identifies 
some of the ECJ holdings in which state initiatives in favor of women are thwarted by 
the weight of the Court's paradigm, highlights the risk of similar holdings in matters of 
affirmative action for racial, ethnic, or religious groups, and questions the legitimacy of 
such holdings in terms of institutional competence. In contrast to some legal 
scholarship on this subject, this Article does not attempt to provide a better doctrinal 
model for the judicial review of states' measures of positive action, [FN15] nor does it 
attempt to resolve the tension between group entitlements and individual rights within 
a coherent theoretical model. [FN16] Rather, the aim here is to show that the variables 
at stake in local positive action schemes are too complex, and too far-reaching, to fit 
comfortably within the scope of the ECJ's jurisdiction. 
A. The ECJ on Positive Action: First Steps 
Gender equality among workers, both formal and substantive, was on the European 
agenda at the very dawn of the project of integration. In the original version of the 
Treaty of Rome, Article 119 stated that "men and women should receive equal pay for 
equal work." [FN17] This principle was clearly meant to equalize the cost of labor for 
employers throughout the Community, to avoid price distortions due to systemic 
differences in production costs. [FN18] But thanks to the political success of feminist 
causes in the 1960s, subsequently reflected in profound transformations of family law 
in continental Europe, gender equality outgrew its strictly economic beginnings and 
became an essential part of the Community's early social policies. [FN19] In the mid- 
1970s, both the ECJ and the legislators of the Community began to develop the 
principle of gender equality in the workplace. [FN20] The Court gradually expanded the 
scope of Article 119 to include both direct and indirect discrimination against 
employees on the basis of gender. The refusal to appoint a pregnant woman is an 
example of direct discrimination, and is an immediate breach of formal equality 
requirements. [FN21] Indirect discrimination occurs whenever an apparently gender-
neutral policy results in poorer conditions for female employees. In terms resembling 
the U.S. treatment of "disparate impact," the Court now requests that employers 
justify their indirectly discriminatory policies in light of legitimate ends, and 
demonstrate proportionality between such ends and the means used to pursue them. 
[FN22] 
In addition to this basic enforcement of the principle of gender equality, in 1976 the 
Council issued a directive permitting member states to "remov[e] existing inequalities 
which affect women's opportunities" in access to employment and working conditions. 
[FN23] In 1984, the Council of Ministers went so far as to issue a non-binding 
document encouraging member states "to adopt a positive action policy designed to 
eliminate existing inequalities affecting women in working life." [FN24] 
Political consensus on the permissibility of special entitlements for female employees 
was relatively easy to reach. Women, after all, are neither a numerical minority, nor a 
group in any sense that is nationally, ethnically, racially, or religiously characterized. 
However, a traditional conception of equality, based on equal individual rights, 
continued to inform the European discourse on gender issues. Equality requires par 
treatment of all individuals, or differential treatment based on objective individual 
differences. A general prohibition against discrimination accompanies the principle of 
equality, and in fact it is often treated as either a synonym or as a necessary corollary 
of all egalitarian imperatives. [FN25] Non-discrimination rules operate, analogously, for 
the protection of individuals. Though they are particularly forceful when the alleged 
discrimination is the result of traditional biases against given groups, they are only 
enforced to address individual instances of inequality. In E.U. discourse, individual 
rights continue to occupy the center- stage. 
Within this framework, the ECJ has conceptualized the possibility of special 
entitlements for women as a "derogation from an individual right." [FN26] Such 
derogations, according to continental constitutional traditions, are occasionally 
permissible, but only if justified by legitimate goals, and only if implemented by non-
disproportionate means. [FN27] States, as a consequence, must design positive action 
policies within the narrow guidelines provided by the principle of proportionality, as 
developed by the ECJ in cases of indirect discrimination. [FN28] 
The potential conflict between individual rights and affirmative action, arising out of 
the Court's equality paradigm, came to a head in 1995 with Kalanke v. Freie 
Hansestadt Bremen. [FN29] The German Federal Labor Court raised the question of 
legitimacy of a provision mandating that employers give priority to equally qualified 
women in sectors where they are underrepresented. [FN30] The German court deemed 
the provision compatible with the German Basic Law and other statutes, [FN31] but 
referred to the ECJ the question of its legitimacy by E.C. standards. The ECJ, in a much 
criticized holding, clung to the ideal of individual rights as conceptually opposite to 
group entitlements for a given gender, and deemed the provision incompatible with the 
E.C. Treaty. [FN32] The Court explained that the plan in question was designed to 
guarantee the automatic result of actual employment, according "absolute and 
unconditional priority" to women applicants. [FN33] This exceeded the scope of the 
1976 directive, only allowing for equality of "opportunities," and infringed upon Mr. 
Kalanke's "individual right" to non- discriminatory treatment. [FN34] The principle of 
proportionality and its nuances informed the opinion of the Advocate General (AG), 
[FN35] but not the Court's holding, which was based on a straightforward rejection of 
automatic group preferences. [FN36] 
Only two years later, under heavy pressure on many fronts, the Court took a more 
favorable look at positive action for women, though stopping a few steps short of full 
endorsement. In Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, as in Kalanke, the German 
provision under scrutiny provided that, between two applicants of equal merit but 
opposite sex, employers should select a female employee. [FN37] This time, however, 
the provision contained a so- called "saving clause": the male candidate (Mr. Marschall 
in this case) could point out alternative criteria of preference, so as to rebut the 
presumption in favor of his female competitor. For instance, he could give evidence of 
his seniority, or of his especially acute family responsibilities. [FN38] More generally, 
he would be entitled to thorough consideration of his professional and personal profile. 
"Secondary criteria of selection" (short of chauvinistic bias) would possibly lead the 
employer to give him the job instead. [FN39] This saving clause, no matter how vague, 
eliminated the invidious automatism of gender preferences, replacing it with a 
personalized assessment of candidates' qualities. [FN40] This was enough, according 
to the Court, to do justice to the principle of equality, as well as to the axiom of 
individual justice. [FN41] 
Kalanke and Marschall generated a flood of commentary. Some praised the Court for 
its somewhat Solomonic endorsement of preferential treatment for women, [FN42] 
while others focused their criticism on the ambiguity of the latter holding. [FN43] Some 
scholars particularly underlined the ECJ's endemic resistance to the concept of group 
justice, as well as its stern defense of individual entitlements against the specter of 
collective claims. [FN44] This point is particularly significant, as it raises the more 
general issue of shared identity in contemporary Europe. The ECJ's reply to the 
question of women's privileged access to the workplace might be, in fact, symptomatic 
of its overall attitude toward collective entitlements. The bigger question lurking behind 
Kalanke and Marschall is to what extent it is plausible within the European Union's 
legal architecture to confer any entitlements to pre-identified collectivities, even when 
this involves economic or political setbacks for the outsiders--a question for the 
twenty- first century. 
B. Marschall's Teeth 
Underlying the Court's reasoning in Kalanke was a sharp distinction between equality 
of opportunities and equality of results, the latter being prohibited by E.C. law. 
Marschall brought about a major change by allowing, in the presence of adequate 
saving clauses, preferential treatment in actual hiring-- arguably a matter of results. 
[FN45] In the German system, such result- oriented measures are in large part 
mitigated by Marschall-type saving clauses, and therefore their validity is not, at 
present, in dispute. Moreover, the Marschall formula still requires that male and female 
candidates be equally qualified for preferential criteria to apply. Meritocracy still 
controls; no other person in the pool of applicants has better qualifications than the 
person who gets the job. However, when the two safeguard mechanisms-- the saving 
clause and par qualifications--are not present, the ECJ does not approve of result-
oriented schemes, also known as fixed-quota systems. 
In a further case on affirmative action, Badeck v. Hessische Ministerpräsident, the ECJ 
upheld a statute enacted by the German Land of Hesse establishing a system of 
"flexible result quotas." [FN46] The argument predictably raised by the applicants--
that the principle of equal treatment confers rights upon individuals, and therefore 
"prohibits giving privileged treatment to a specific group" [FN47]--was dismissed due 
to the highly nuanced character of the quota system under scrutiny. Most importantly, 
the Hessian scheme required full evidence of equal qualifications prior to the triggering 
of gender preferences, and was riddled with exceptions. [FN48] It met, in other words, 
the two safeguard mechanisms required by the Marschall holding. 
The rationale of Kalanke, Marschall, and Badeck sheds light on the semantics of 
positive action--a term chosen to distinguish European practices from U.S.- born 
affirmative action. The alleged distinction lies in the fact that positive action is 
conceptually in tune with the principle of equality, while affirmative action is not. 
Positive action aims at leveling the field for all players. It favors traditionally 
discriminated categories of individuals by allowing them to compete on an equal 
footing, but it does not promise them victory. It consists of a number of techniques, 
such as special training and educational opportunities, which do involve redistribution 
or diversion of resources from one group to another. Yet, according to popular 
European views, these techniques are only meant to allow for a fair game. Positive 
action is, in other words, inspired by the goal of substantive equality, which demands 
that unequal situations be treated differently. On those occasions in which actual 
hirings or promotions are based on preferential criteria, reverse discrimination might 
be an issue. [FN49] But individual rights are still guaranteed by merit-based 
assessment and by suspension or reversal of such criteria in light of specific 
circumstances. 
While their validity by E.C. standards is beyond question, the effectiveness of positive 
action plans is a different matter. Where these schemes have been applied, the 
proportion of women in the workplace has remained static rather than having 
improved. One reason for this result may lie in these plans' most debatable feature--
the need to demonstrate equivalent qualifications of male and female candidates 
before any preferential criterion is triggered. An expert of the German labor market, 
commenting on such data, has observed that "[i]t is fairly easy to evade decision 
quotas by simply denying the presence of equal qualifications." [FN50] If this is true, 
the type of positive action endorsed by the ECJ may be missing the real point. Such 
remarks may not concern the ECJ so long as its own vetting of positive action coincides 
with the law and policy choices prevailing in a given member state. [FN51] But the 
issue is one of practical importance, because some E.U. members have indeed 
conceived of much more aggressive plans in favor of women. 
C. Impermissible Measures: Abrahamsson and Griesmar 
When comparing highly subjective, debatable qualifications such as academic merit or 
aesthetics, the requirement of equal qualifications may become a stumbling block for 
even the most earnest positive action programs. Determining whether two applicants 
for the same post have equal--that is, equivalent--qualifications requires considerable 
discretion and value judgment. Traditional gender bias may therefore result in 
involuntary but systemic underestimation of female candidates' career achievements. 
For these reasons, a 1995 Swedish regulation, limited in scope to teaching posts in 
higher educational institutions, dispensed of the usual prerequisite of par 
qualifications: a woman possessing "sufficient qualifications for the post" could be 
appointed in preference to a male candidate who would otherwise have been chosen. 
[FN52] This rather blunt and aggressive form of positive discrimination came with a 
correcting device. It could only operate if "the difference between the [two] candidates' 
qualifications [was not] so great [as to] breach ... the requirement of objectivity in the 
making of appointments." [FN53] In a case recently brought before the ECJ, 
Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, these guidelines had led to the appointment of a female 
professor of hydrosphere sciences at the University of Göteborg. [FN54] The referring 
court, relying on the intervention of the Swedish government, validated the reading of 
the constitutional principle of objectivity as applied at the University of Göteborg. In 
the implementation of the relevant affirmative scheme, high academic standards had 
been preserved; administrators struck the right balance between the objective 
assessment of candidates' overall qualities and the need to promote gender equality in 
academia. [FN55] The ECJ, however, did not find this analysis persuasive. The Swedish 
scheme could not pass muster for a number of reasons: (a) it contained no saving 
clause for the male candidate and therefore operated in an impermissibly automatic 
fashion; (b) it did not use, in the assessment of candidates, sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous criteria; and (c) to the extent that it pursued the legitimate goal of 
compensating for women's professional disadvantages, it did so disproportionately. 
[FN56] If proportionality is not respected, gender preferences cannot meet the equality 
standards of the Union, and remain impermissible derogations from individual rights. 
[FN57] 
The Commission welcomed the Abrahamsson decision. Interestingly, on its official Web 
site, the Commission advertised the case as one that "upheld Swedish measures to 
combat female under-representation in employment." [FN58] This is only partly true. 
The Court did confirm the permissibility of positive discrimination in favor of women, 
and explained that gender may operate as a tie-breaker once a tie is established, 
thereby rejecting with unprecedented clarity the logic of Kalanke. [FN59] However, 
Abrahamsson significantly curtailed the scope of the Swedish regulation in question. 
The administrators of the University interpreted it to mean that, because the principle 
of objective assessment was not violated--the female candidate was certainly worthy 
of that academic post--the requirement of par qualifications could be mildly relaxed. 
Quite to the contrary, after Abrahamsson, the formalistic threshold of equal 
qualifications must be unquestionably met. The female candidate must be just as good 
as her male competitor. It is only at that point that, rather than tossing a coin, 
University deans can use gender as a basis for their final decision. 
This case reveals a serious clash of attitudes between the ECJ and a member state on 
affirmative action. In the view of the Swedish establishment, the Marschall prerequisite 
of par qualifications is clearly inadequate to address representational deficiencies in the 
academic community. Yet, it continues to control the supranational legitimacy of 
positive action policies. 
Supranational scrutiny takes the shape of a proportionality test. Through the principle 
of proportionality, state measures on group affirmation can be reconciled with equality. 
The test of proportionality consists of three parts: (a) whether a given legislative or 
administrative measure aims at a legitimate goal; (b) whether the challenged measure 
is in fact necessary to pursue the identified goal; and (c) whether the means envisaged 
are not disproportionate to the goal pursued. Proportionality has, for many years, 
guided the ECJ in determining whether Community legislation, or state action in an 
area of Community competency, oversteps the boundaries of means-to-ends 
proportion. [FN60] Unquestionably, each step of this scrutiny engages the Court in a 
delicate balance of institutional competencies, and in the extremely complex art of 
ranking, by importance, multiple policy objectives pursued by national lawmakers. 
The bulk of proportionality review is to be found in the Court's control over state 
measures impinging upon the free movement of goods, services, or persons for the 
alleged purpose of protecting public health or public order. In these contexts, the ECJ's 
institutional or actual competence to handle proportionality review is often taken for 
granted. One may question, however, the usefulness or propriety of proportionality 
review in positive action cases. In an article on proportionality in E.C. law, Gráinne De 
Búrca wrote: 
In certain specific political contexts ... courts tend to be considerably more deferential 
in their review. They are more reluctant to adjudicate if the interest affected is seen as 
a collective or general public interest rather than an individual right, and if the interest 
of the State is a mixed or complex one, e.g. in an area involving national economic and 
social policy choices .... Or even if [the challenged measure] does affect a recognized 
right, [it may be that] it also concerns many other interests, both individual and 
general, over which the policy maker has presumably deliberated at length in coming 
to a decision .... The ways in which a court may defer in such circumstances range 
from deeming the measure non- justiciable, to refus[ing] to look closely at the 
justification for [its] restrictive effects .... [FN61] 
As a matter of fact, where doubts have arisen as to its full understanding of the 
means-to-ends inquiry in a given sociopolitical context, the ECJ has engaged in self-
restraint, leaving national courts in charge of the final findings. [FN62] But self-
restraint is certainly not the keynote of positive-action scrutiny. With Abrahamsson, 
the ECJ has taken upon itself the role of arbiter on such issues as the means used to 
achieve diverse representation in academic institutions. It has also claimed 
competency to second-guess that state's educational values: traditional scholarly 
ranking, according to the Court, must still prevail over more rounded concepts of 
objectivity, even when the local governance has come, over time, to a different 
conclusion. [FN63] 
D. Positive Action and the European Union's Constitutional Asymmetry 
The top-down, supranational definition of such complex social matters as positive 
action in the European Union is particularly troublesome in light of the Union's 
"constitutional asymmetry." [FN64] In the enforcement of the E.C. Treaty's 
fundamental freedoms (providing for virtually untrammeled transborder circulation of 
goods, workers, services, and capital), the ECJ finds itself endowed with tremendous 
deregulatory powers. By contrast, when it comes to the task of devising new 
regulatory projects for Europe, E.C. institutions find innumerable obstacles in the 
substantive and procedural provisions of the treaty. In matters of pensions and 
retirement benefits, for example, E.C. courts and legislators can force member states 
to abolish all forms of discrimination based on nationality. States may also have to 
equalize pension benefits for men and women. [FN65] But the possibility of 
redesigning, through E.C. secondary legislation, the substance of retirement benefits is 
quite meager. [FN66] Analogously, the European Union cannot impose its own vision of 
incentive measures to promote gender equality in the workplace, but must limit itself 
to encouraging states to come up with effective plans. Against this background, the 
recent ECJ holding in Griesmar v. Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de 
l'Industrie illustrates how the supranational scrutiny of states' positive action programs 
may create an unwarranted legislative deficit in crucial social matters. [FN67] 
Griesmar came to the attention of the ECJ upon reference from the Conseil d'État. 
[FN68] Article L12b of the French Civil and Military Retirement Pensions Code 
mandated special pension credits for female civil servants. [FN69] For the purposes of 
computing pension allowances upon retirement, women were entitled to a virtual 
lengthening of their years of service: one year per child, depending on motherhood 
only, and not on actual maternity leaves interrupting their employment. [FN70] In 
1999 Mr. Griesmar, a French magistrate and father of three children, claimed to be 
entitled to the same benefit. The Conseil referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling on the compatibility of the provision with Community law on gender equality. 
The Court noted that the provision in question, according to its preparatory 
documents, was originally meant to induce female employees to suspend work and 
take care of their babies for a while, without fear of losing any of their pension rights 
upon retirement. [FN71] By this logic, the provision was unduly overinclusive, as it also 
applied to women who had not taken any time off due to maternity. But it was also 
underinclusive, and discriminatory, insofar as it did not apply to those fathers who 
happened to shoulder the child-rearing burden. 
The arguments of the French government in favor of Article L12b's legitimacy were 
very different. In the government's view, the purpose of that provision was: to address 
a social reality, namely the disadvantages which [female civil servants] incur in the 
course of their professional career by virtue of the predominant role assigned to them 
in bringing up children. The purpose of [the pension credit was] thus to offset the 
disadvantages which female civil servants who have had children encounter in their 
professional life, even though they have not ceased working in order to bring up their 
children. [FN72] 
This may be true, the Court reasoned, but not enough to withstand Griesmar's 
rebuttal. As in Marschall, the Court was unwilling to go along with stereotypes, even 
when stereotypes coincided with well-established features of task-allocation in the 
family. Applying its Marschall formula, the court stated that if a male civil servant 
proves that he did, in fact, bring up his children, he must be entitled to the same 
benefit. [FN73] The presumption that mothers--even full-time working mothers--do 
most of the child-rearing work must be lifted if Mr. Griesmar and other fathers can 
prove it unwarranted in light of personal experience. Article L12b of the Pensions Code 
was therefore at odds with the Union's gender equality law insofar as it did not 
contemplate this possibility. [FN74] 
Once more, there are reasons to doubt the sensibility of the Court's holding. In terms 
of strict logic, it may be a straightforward application of the Court's understanding of 
equality. Viewed in terms of European social engineering, however, Griesmar holds 
much less persuasive force. There are many ways in which the state, as employer, 
may encourage women to join the workforce. In many European states, it is thanks to 
employment in the public sector, and to special accommodations for the protection of 
the family, that women are adequately represented in the workplace. [FN75] The 
Pensions Code's preference may well have made sense in the French design of public 
employment, but the Griesmar holding interferes with that design. It is de- regulatory, 
and very effectively so, thanks to the immediate enforceability of ECJ holdings. But it 
does not, and cannot, point to reconstructive suggestions, because social engineering 
at large is not within the competency of the Union. Holdings like Griesmar do not 
relieve member states of the task of designing optimal formulae for a diverse 
workplace, and yet burden them with deregulatory constraints. [FN76] 
E. Positive Action Beyond Gender: The New Equality Directives 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997 and effective as of May 1, 1999, modified 
the original Article 119 on gender equality by adding to it an explicit, though vague, 
endorsement of positive action. [FN77] The new Article 141 is now the only provision 
in the Treaty making explicit room for positive action. Gender, however, is only one of 
the many grounds for discrimination outlawed by the E.C. Treaty. 
Acts of discrimination among Community workers on grounds of nationality were 
prohibited at the very start of the integration project as clearly in conflict with the idea 
of a seamless labor market. [FN78] Discrimination on grounds of nationality was also 
subject to a general prohibition, ranking among the "Principles" of the Treaty of Rome. 
[FN79] In 1997, the Amsterdam reform empowered E.C. lawmakers to "combat 
discrimination based on ... racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation." [FN80] Just like the prohibition against gender discrimination, 
these provisions are underpinned by the logic of a seamless market, as they clearly 
promote the mobility of labor and the equalization of labor costs throughout the Union. 
At the same time, non-discrimination articles also expand the legal basis for E.C. action 
in social matters. Article 13 was soon invoked as the legal basis for two new pieces of 
anti-discrimination legislation. Council Directive 2000/43 implements the principle of 
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. [FN81] Council 
Directive 2000/78, in furtherance of the same project, addresses more broadly 
"discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation," and 
aims at establishing a general framework for equal treatment in matters of 
employment and occupation. [FN82] The preamble to the Framework Employment 
Directive makes it clear that gender equality in the workplace and equal treatment at 
large are really pieces of the same puzzle to be dealt with as an indivisible set of policy 
questions. [FN83] 
Both directives, which member states are currently in the process of implementing, 
were issued in the year 2000, the same year in which the ECJ decided Abrahamsson. 
Both directives seem remarkably tolerant of member states' choices with regard to 
group protection, and contain the following provision: "Positive action--With a view to 
ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any 
Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages linked to [the above-listed characteristics]." [FN84] This 
text is entirely in line with E.C. Treaty Article 141(4), which permits states to pursue 
the strategy of positive discrimination well beyond the limits imposed by a formal 
conception of gender equality. [FN85] And just like Article 141(4), the directives leave 
plenty of room for the Court to scrutinize state measures. [FN86] It is not clear how 
the new legislation will coordinate with existing laws in coterminous fields--most 
importantly, the 1976 directive on gender discrimination--and with the case law of the 
ECJ in equality matters. It is likely, however, that the rather bulky body of judicial 
holdings regarding discrimination based on gender will provide firm guidelines for the 
interpretation of the new directives. This option would promote clarity and uniformity. 
[FN87] It would also extend to race, ethnicity, and religion the impressive level of 
awareness, legislation, and enforcement of non- discrimination rules achieved in 
gender matters. For these reasons, the extension of gender discrimination 
jurisprudence into other areas is a desirable option. [FN88] But when it comes to 
positive action, the legacy of gender cases decided by the ECJ thus far may pose 
serious risks. [FN89] The new directives attempt to strike a compromise between the 
need to ensure uniformity in the enforcement of equality, and member states' 
aspirations to engineer their own models of diverse society. As Abrahamsson and 
Griesmar demonstrate, it is far from clear that this delicate architecture will survive 
challenges before the ECJ. The Court may soon have to face national instances of 
positive and affirmative action in fields that are much more controversial than gender, 
while relying on the rather rudimentary analytical framework developed around 
women's issues. [FN90] 
III. POSITIVE ACTION, EQUALITY, AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN E.U. LAW 
Within the conceptual framework of the ECJ, positive action appears to be inherently at 
odds with equality, because it involves privileging a subset of citizens while failing to 
take account of actual differences and similarities between individuals. [FN91] Even in 
its mildest version, it is, indeed, a form of differential treatment, and implicates issues 
of collective justice. For positive action to exist, there needs to be a formula capable of 
restoring the internal consistency of the rule of law. [FN92] The formula must be 
justiciable, and designed to screen away those forms of positive action that would 
compromise the coherence of the equality architecture. As illustrated in Part II, the ECJ 
has determined that the test of proportionality can accomplish this task, ensuring that 
states' pursuit of equality by means of positive discrimination does not violate the 
canons of equality. The core of individual equality is still preserved by means of formal 
devices: saving clauses, strict meritocracy, illegality of result-based or "hard" 
affirmative actions, inadmissibility of firm quotas of representation, and so on, are all 
mechanisms meant to ensure that the group in need of protection has not taken over, 
and that all other individuals outside that group can still rely on the judicial protection 
of their ultimate right to equal treatment. 
In the specific context of E.U. law, this understanding of positive action leads to a 
particularly thorny conundrum. Both according to the new equality directives and 
under E.C. Treaty Article 141(4), the principle of non- discrimination acts as a floor, 
rather than a ceiling. The Union is in charge of prohibiting discrimination in its classic, 
negative form: no one can be treated differently on the basis of ethnicity, religion, etc. 
At the same time, states can aim at higher degrees of substantive equality by enacting 
measures of preferential treatment for groups traditionally discriminated against, 
depending on local context and politics. This construct has the comforting flavor of 
subsidiarity [FN93] and the support of considerable experience in the field of gender 
equality. The problem with this construct is that, as usual, the structure of the floor 
imposes limits upon the height and shape of the ceiling. The two are so conceptually 
intertwined that the states' freedom to experiment with affirmative group policies, 
given them by E.C. legislators, is intrinsically curtailed by the ECJ's equality review. 
The need for an internally coherent picture, bringing into harmony the ECJ's 
enforcement of equality and national positive action policies, is overstated for 
theoretical and empirical reasons. In E.U. law, one finds both a strong emphasis on 
individual rights, and a political commitment to redress collective inequalities. 
A. The Uncertain Boundaries of Equality in the European Union 
The doctrinal architecture that leads the Court to such holdings as Abrahamsson rests, 
ultimately, on the time-honored pillar of formal equality. This pillar, however, is not as 
structurally sound as it seems. There is no coherent vision of equality in the project of 
European integration. [FN94] The prohibition against discrimination features in a 
number of scattered provisions, and it is only thanks to the painstaking work of the 
ECJ that it has developed into "the general principle of equal treatment" as we know it 
today. [FN95] The principle arguably is not general, and if measured by standards of 
coherence, it may not even be an E.U. principle at all. [FN96] 
There are many policy areas in which the principle of equality is not meant to control. 
The new equality directives illustrate this point. The path to their adoption was paved 
with the best of intentions. In 1997, the "European Year Against Racism," the Union 
embarked on a series of projects aimed at combating racial discrimination in all of its 
forms. [FN97] The directives, however, are encumbered by the hybrid nature of 
supranationalism, which splits competencies between Brussels and state authorities 
along the often illogical lines of historical development. [FN98] For E.C. legislators, the 
impossibility of thoroughly regulating the status of third-country nationals residing in 
the Union seriously compromises the coherence of the directives. [FN99] The result is, 
once more, the coexistence of different standards of equal treatment, depending upon 
possession of an E.U. passport rather than upon universal values. [FN100] Thus far the 
E.U. establishment has taken for granted that equal treatment would only pertain to 
E.U. citizens. To be sure, by signing a number of association agreements with third 
countries, E.U. members have allowed the nationals of some non-member states to 
join the club of the non-discriminable. [FN101] This move has shifted outwards the 
geographical boundaries of certain Community guarantees. The fact remains, however, 
that many foreign nationals permanently residing in Europe do not yet enjoy the 
protection of the equality principle. 
At the same time, the Court's intervention in equality matters can be quite inclusive. In 
theory, in all those fields that exceed the reach of Community competence, states 
would not have to comply with European non-discrimination principles. In practice, this 
line is not so easy to draw. For instance, some social benefits are covered by the 
principle of equality, and some are not, depending on policy considerations. [FN102] 
More generally, there is still no firm definition of the set of "situations governed by 
Community law." [FN103] And even when clearly not within that set, a subject matter 
may be reached by the long arm of equality jurisprudence. For example, social security 
falls outside the sphere of Community competence, but the Court has held that states' 
social security laws cannot discriminate against other member states' nationals. 
[FN104] 
These uncertainties cast preliminary shadows upon the equality-based syllogism 
motivating the ECJ's holdings on positive action. The picture becomes even less clear if 
one focuses on the axiom that equality must be understood in terms of individual 
justice, and cannot accommodate measures based upon collective identity. A series of 
legislative measures, administrative practices, and judicial opinions emphasizing the 
relevance of collective identity policies in the European Union's vision of justice 
regularly contradicts the rhetoric of individuals rights--a rhetoric powerfully echoed in 
the ECJ's holdings on positive action. 
B. The E.U. Theorem of Individual Rights: Historical and Economic Foundations 
The legal integration of Europe is traditionally founded upon an individual conception of 
rights and entitlements. This feature stems from the Union's historical premises. The 
EEC was born out of the ashes of World War II. [FN105] The power of its design relied 
on the promise that, thanks to economic integration, conflicts on the scale of what was 
just experienced would be hence-forth impossible. The founding fathers of the 
Community, in whose minds the horrors of the Holocaust were still very vivid, would 
have been righteously contemptuous of identity-based entitlements. Group rights were 
also largely discredited in international law and politics due to the failure of the League 
of Nations' minority protection scheme. [FN106] 
This ideological aversion to group rights in the late 1940s also characterized the 
parallel development of the Council of Europe. [FN107] The 1950 European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights [FN108] and Fundamental Freedoms had little or 
nothing to say on the issue of group affiliation. [FN109] The Convention's non-
discrimination clause [FN110] was conceived as merely accessory to whatever 
substantive rights might stem from other provisions. A recently added Protocol 12 
promotes that clause to the status of a fundamental right to non-discrimination. 
[FN111] The Protocol's preamble recites that states will not be prevented from taking 
measures to promote "effective equality," [FN112] but its main body remains silent on 
positive action. A half-century later, it is still the case that "the Convention and its 
control system ... are based on the collective guarantee of individual rights which are 
formulated in terms sufficiently specific to be justiciable." [FN113] 
During the foundational period of the Community, a number of landmark ECJ decisions 
reinforced the original emphasis on individual justice. The centrality of individual 
subjects proved to be a clever state-breaking device, meant to enhance the 
supranational strength of the "new legal order." [FN114] By dispensing rights 
immediately enforceable by individuals, the Community could bypass the filter of 
states' authority, rendering states' mediation unnecessary. In this light, the doctrine of 
direct effect represents the quintessential triumph of individuals over their community 
of formal affiliation. [FN115] 
Another ideological force driving the economic project of integration was a faith in the 
freedom of market actors, couched in ordo-liberal theory. [FN116] According to that 
strain of thought, integration was to be achieved by protecting individual market 
players from overbearing government intervention. State interference with private 
enterprise would be appropriate only to enforce the rule of (private) law in horizontal 
transactions, subject to a sort of "economic due process" clause. Competition law 
would help guarantee sufficient leeway for individual action. The connection between 
individual fundamental freedoms and the "economic constitution" of the Union 
continues to be strong. [FN117] 
This conception of equality yields, as necessary byproducts, a number of basic 
concepts easily reducible to pairs of opposites. First comes the goal of market 
integration, which presupposes the dismantling of a great deal of state regulation, and 
the protection of market freedom for all individuals. In this atomistic view of market 
actors, there is no room for groups, or for group justice. In a free market, rights are 
for individuals only. They are fundamental "liberty" rights, to be protected by negative 
means (i.e., prohibition against all encroachments from either private groups or 
government) rather than by positive channeling of the spontaneous forces of the 
market. Liberty rights are adequately protected by a formal enforcement of equality. 
Substantive or factual equality cannot and should not be attained by means of law, but 
perhaps within the separate sphere of politics. Put differently, the law will only protect 
equality of opportunities, not equality of results. 
The dichotomies embodied in this discourse survive in the daily practice of Community 
law: individual versus group, form versus substance, opportunities versus results, 
negative versus positive integration, and law versus politics. The rhetoric of individual 
rights is still informed by such archetypes. 
C. Individual Rights and Equality in Contemporary Europe 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, solemnly proclaimed by the 
European Union's Heads of State in 2000 but not (yet) an official source of binding law, 
is firmly anchored upon an individual conception of rights. [FN118] It permits 
derogation from equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment, 
[FN119] thereby reflecting the current version of E.C. Treaty Article 141(4). A separate 
article promises respect for cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity, but not in a 
manner that might support the legitimacy of identity-based preferential treatments. 
[FN120] The charter does incorporate social rights, which would certainly lead to the 
enactment and enforcement of policies at least implicitly designed to address 
marginalized minorities. "The social," however, can be conceptualized as identity-
neutral; it does not conflict with the principle of equality insofar as it targets all people 
who happen to fall below a certain standard of living due to their income. And it is a 
fundamental tenet of our times that being destitute is (hopefully) a transient condition, 
rather than an immutable characteristic. It is thanks to this syllogism that the welfare 
goal of reaching out to those in need is deemed perfectly compatible with the logic of 
egalitarianism. [FN121] The rhetoric of neutrality, however, hinders the reach and 
scope of social reform, and puts the Union in the unpalatable role of curbing some 
social initiatives of state governments. 
Public procurement offers a clear example of this phenomenon. The European 
Community has legislated in the field of public procurement with the clear objective to 
prevent member states from favoring local business and discriminating against firms 
based elsewhere in the Union. [FN122] As always, the principle of non-discrimination is 
achieved by the enforcement of equality. Here, equality is promoted by anchoring the 
selection process to purely economic criteria. This serves the purpose of forcing 
national protectionism out of the picture. But it also eliminates, as an unnecessary 
byproduct, the use of other social criteria by states that might have otherwise been 
taken into account in choosing the most appealing bid. Exceptionally, "[c]riteria 
involving social considerations may be used to determine the most economically 
advantageous tender where they provide an economic advantage for the contracting 
authority," [FN123] but social goals per se cannot inform the selection process. By this 
token, minorities cannot benefit from preferential treatment in public procurement. The 
impossibility of granting minorities any special status in public procurement results, 
allegedly, from no less than international obligations: the commitments undertaken by 
the member states in the Agreement on Government Procurement, [FN124] concluded 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, are "incompatible" with quotas or 
other privileges for special categories of bidders. [FN125] Preferences of any kind are 
excluded, moreover, by "the general principle of non- discrimination." [FN126] 
The choice not to allow for identity-based criteria in the selection of tenders is, 
unquestionably, a political one. It is mandated by reasons of convenience and a 
balance of interests in the international sphere. It is a choice made against a 
background of plausible alternatives. [FN127] Instead, the Commission advertises its 
choice as the compelled result of fundamental legal principles in the Community, such 
as non-discrimination and compliance with the rule of law. This rhetoric stifles any 
debate on the topic. 
D. The Other Theorem: Identity Matters in E.U. Law 
The commonplace portrait of E.U. law's indifference to collective identity in Europe--the 
very portrait upon which the ECJ grounds its own positive action jurisprudence--
provides only part of the picture of the European equality discourse. The Union is 
based upon the principle of equal individual rights, but it is, at the same time, quite 
involved in the recognition, protection, and proactive enhancement of groups. 
Ambivalence on such matters is endemic to the E.U. system. As observed, individuals 
are central to the project of integration; they are primary holders of legal entitlements. 
At the same time, the decline of the very concept of the nation-state is essential to the 
success of the integration project, and as nation-states fade away, sub- or 
transnational communities defined by common ethnicity, language, or religion come to 
the fore seeking enhanced status. [FN128] The Union provides transnational 
communities with communication channels that transcend state boundaries, and with 
institutions that enjoy supremacy over state actors. The fight against discrimination is 
only one form of assistance toward marginalized groups. Collective identity is not only 
conceptually relevant, but also an essential factor in certain redistributive policies at 
the E.U. level. 
Culture is of particular significance in providing groups with special entitlements 
without upsetting in any visible way the assumption of identity- blindness in the 
distribution of resources. Speaking the politically palatable language of "cultures," E.U. 
policymakers enhance, by means of tangible aids, the meaning and visibility of ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic groups. 
The Directorate General for Education and Culture is becoming increasingly involved in 
the question of immigrant identities. In cooperation with a number of state 
universities, for instance, in 1998 the Directorate launched Euromed Heritage, a 
"regional programme in support of the development of Euro- Mediterranean cultural 
heritage." [FN129] The program provides generous funding for such events as the 
"Unimed Symposium," a conference on the "intangible cultures" of Southern Europe, 
North Africa, and the Middle East. The official Web site of the Directorate, in 
unmistakably postmodern jargon, defines "intangible culture" as "a set of values linked 
to the collective memory and to the imaginary that contribute to the identity of ... each 
social group." [FN130] In all such programs, the wording is airy. Rights--cultural or 
social--are not implicated. There are no justiciable claims. But identity-based 
redistribution of Euro funds occurs nevertheless. 
In fact, the cultural strand of identity discourse is often more prominent in E.U. 
lawmakers' agendas than in the agendas of member states. Sub- or transnational 
groups defined by common language or ethnicity, which fail to identify with traditional 
nation-state boundaries, and which struggle for survival, receive significant 
supranational attention. In turn, such groups can perform a state-breaking function 
and advance the cause of integration. The subject is coterminous with human rights 
protection, but differs from human rights discourse insofar as it implies necessarily the 
sheltering of collective identity from atomistic dilution and assimilation. The protection 
of cultural diversity requires, in other words, positive action by government, surely 
defying the principle of formal equality. "Negative" anti-discrimination policies will not 
suffice. [FN131] 
Central to the livelihood of separate cultures is the survival of minority languages. The 
ECJ's case law on the protection of minority languages contains significant overtures 
toward group recognition. [FN132] To be sure, the Union's commitment to minority 
languages is burdened by institutional limits, due to the complex legacy of the 
economic integration project. [FN133] The European Union is still struggling to identify 
a clear balance between the protection of linguistic or ethnic traditions and the 
seamless integration of the market. The goal of protecting the identity of minorities 
may be in conflict with economic integration and its promises of free trade and travel. 
In these cases, the Court feels compelled to dilute collective identities in order to iron 
out the seams of state borders. [FN134] The Court's qualms, however, do not depend 
on concerns for identity-blindness. There is no fear, in this context, of trumping the 
rights of the majority by aiding identified minorities. It is understood that the survival 
of minority languages is a legitimate goal justifying the redistribution of economic 
resources in favor of supporting linguistic minorities. [FN135] 
When market partitions are not immediately at stake, the European Union is indeed 
quite generous in its validation of groups' cultural or linguistic demands. The Union has 
helped finance various programs meant to support the existence of minority languages 
and cultures. [FN136] Basis for such action has been found either in E.C. Treaty Article 
151, which asks the Community to contribute to the "flowering of the cultures of the 
member States," [FN137] or in the more traditional provisions favoring the free 
movement of workers. For instance, EEC Treaty Article 49 (now E.C. Treaty Article 40) 
was the basis for Council Directive 77/486, ensuring education in the official language 
(or one of the official languages) of a member state for children of migrant workers. 
[FN138] In this context, cultural goals merge with the workers' right to adequate 
education for their children. [FN139] 
Together with the Council of Europe, the Union inaugurated the new millennium with a 
"European Year of Languages." [FN140] During 2001 the Commission funded a number 
of innovative learning projects, covering not only the official languages of the member 
states but, more significantly, regional and minority languages as well. [FN141] 
Union policies have targeted not only the cultural vitality of minorities, but also their 
material welfare. "The social" is an important piece in the constitutional architecture of 
the Union, and it finds many incarnations in secondary legislation and policies. Welfare, 
understood as redistribution of resources in favor of those in need, has seemingly 
nothing to do with identity because it targets poverty and exclusion wherever they 
happen to be. Yet identity-sensitive criteria are often used to improve the effectiveness 
of re- distributive policies. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
(EUMC)--an E.U. agency established in 1997--is tasked with the reduction of existing 
discrimination in Europe. It is also actively involved in the socioeconomic promotion of 
minority groups. Through the EUMC, the European Union spends money in connection 
with policies that identify specific disadvantaged groups on the basis of ethnicity or 
nationality. This practice is not immediately visible. The EUMC offers indirect but 
substantial support to a number of projects for the rehabilitation of minorities, which 
are in turn run by independent and state-funded foundations. Among these projects, 
coordinated through the EUMC and financed in ways that erase the public-private 
divide, one finds several forms of positive action in favor of identity-defined groups in 
the fields of education, housing, and employment. [FN142] 
E.U. regional intervention by means of structural funds may be regarded as an even 
subtler instance of allocation of E.U. resources on the basis of identity. [FN143] Target 
areas are defined in purely geographical terms, with no reference to the ethnicity or 
nationality of their inhabitants. But it is often the case that specific communities, 
characterized by common values and origins, are in fact singled out as the recipients of 
E.U. aid. In Germany, for instance, E.U. structural funds given to the region of North-
Rhine Westphalia-- home to many Turkish immigrants--are used to bolster local start-
up businesses, effectively targeting an ethnic group with job growth and educational 
programs. [FN144] In such schemes, the distinction between opportunities and results 
is particularly difficult to maintain. Along the continuum of identity- based 
redistribution, this form of intervention may be less conspicuous than affirmative 
action, yet it is inspired by the same logic. 
E. Redistribution Unchallenged: Affirmative Action Between Law and Politics 
Interestingly, the redistributive policies just mentioned are not usually expressed 
through rights discourse and remain unchallenged. This may be explained, in part, by 
the relative opacity of these mechanisms, [FN145] and by the myth that the 
mechanisms themselves are based on allegedly neutral criteria of selection (poverty, 
marginalization, etc.). Furthermore, the Commission and other E.U. actors enjoy ample 
decisional leeway in the implementation of such programs. European Union policies 
must find support in specific acts of secondary legislation, [FN146] but the actual 
administration of resources and selection of beneficiaries are left to the discretion of 
the Union's executive powers. Yet discretion alone does not explain the lack of judicial 
challenges. Discretionary acts of the Union's executive, like all Community acts, are 
subject to judicial review, and therefore to the constraints of such general principles as 
equality and proportionality. [FN147] Why then are the mechanisms of redistribution 
exemplified in the preceding section not likely to undergo judicial scrutiny before the 
ECJ? 
The broader context provides a likely explanation. The Union, just like the member 
states, has a composite political mandate, embodying both traditional liberal rights 
imperatives and social aspirations to solidarity. [FN148] In some cases the obligation 
of solidarity is more obvious than in others, and the goals pursued by redistributive 
measures are subject to little dispute. The creation of jobs for immigrants is, indeed, a 
form of reallocation of resources, and one that may even grant automatic privileges to 
people of particular ethnicity or religion. However, if there is sufficient political 
consensus on the need to redress the traditional disadvantage of those immigrants, 
privileges are conceptualized not as positive or affirmative action, but rather as a 
practical implementation of substantive equality. On the other hand, when the 
identified need does not meet general consensus, catering to it may look like positive 
discrimination, arguably illegitimate or disproportionate. European Union policies, even 
though targeting identity-based groups, escape equality challenges insofar as they are 
supported by sufficient political consensus, and if perceived by the Union's 
constituency as necessary to the goal of substantive equality. 
F. Redistribution and Positive Action in the Member States 
When it comes to redistributive policies enacted by member states, the traditional 
attitude of the Union is one of non-interference. Member states are mostly in control of 
direct taxation, for instance. [FN149] Fiscal policies--the most conspicuous form of 
redistribution in western societies--are legitimate insofar as the diversion of resources 
they imply is warranted by political consensus as expressed by each state's 
constituency. The same is true for welfare and most economic policies, subject to the 
aggregate, quantitative constraints imposed by the Monetary Union, but free of 
supranational control in terms of quality and overall design. Vivien Schmidt has 
observed, poignantly, that  
[t]here is ... certainly no European welfare state in the offing .... This is not only 
because of the near-impossibility of such a task, given the diversity and complexity of 
national social security systems, but also because of ... an 'asymmetrical' EMU in which 
the monetary was highly developed and the economic only minimally. [States] did not 
want to consider national fiscal and social policies or the issues of wealth distribution at 
the European level, convinced that the issues were too politically sensitive and better 
left to piecemeal, national-level changes in response to the pressures of market forces. 
[FN150] 
It is within this context that the Union should conceive of states' positive action 
programs. In any form--with or without saving clauses, targets, quotas, or merit-based 
controls--affirmative measures in favor of marginalized minorities can be thought of as 
ways to redistribute wealth within a given constituency from one group of subjects to 
another. [FN151] Redistribution of resources may take many forms. Positive action is, 
indeed, a peculiar form of redistribution, as it is based on collective identity rather than 
upon income or other (supposedly) neutral criteria. But in this regard it is not unique. 
On the basis of its socioeconomic function, positive action belongs on a continuum of 
multiple forms of identity-based redistribution of resources. Along this continuum, 
positive action shares the same logic of many other state policies that the ECJ could 
not, and does not, review in traditional equality terms. Locating positive action along a 
continuum of redistributive schemes shows how individual equality is an inappropriate 
analytical framework for the purpose of determining the legitimacy of such policies. 
IV. BLIND JUSTICE AND IDENTITY-BASED REDISTRIBUTION IN THE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE OF 
THE MEMBER STATES 
This Part identifies a gap between the reality of states' policies and the ECJ's equality 
paradigm in positive action cases. A number of French regulations or programs that 
target specific minorities will illustrate this point. These examples are also meant to 
support a claim that has growing resonance among political scientists: the continental 
rhetoric that rejects multiculturalism coexists, in practice, with policies favoring plural 
identities in the public space. [FN152] The French experience can be generalized to 
identify those features of European discourse most often employed to justify otherwise 
impermissible practices of identity-based allocation of resources. These practices 
belong on a continuum of redistributive state policies, which may exceed the scope of 
supranational competence and therefore should not be subject to equality review 
before the ECJ. 
A. Limits of the Equality Paradigm: Lessons from the Member States 
At a crucial point in the history of European integration, the ECJ began to write its own 
chapter on fundamental rights. This judicial move was strikingly radical, as it lacked 
textual basis in the Treaty of Rome and marked a clear departure from the purely 
economic foundations for integration of the 1950s. [FN153] At the same time, 
however, the move fell well within the prediction of neo-functionalist analyses: any 
integration effort, no matter how narrowly conceived at its start, would bring about the 
unavoidable spillover effect of jurisdictional expansion. [FN154] Most cautious in its 
early steps, the ECJ ventured into the uncharted territory of Community fundamental 
rights by pledging deference to the member states' established authorities: "In 
safeguarding [fundamental] rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States." [FN155] 
For the sake of the "uniformity and efficacy" of European law, [FN156] the Court also 
made clear that national constitutions would not control the Community's fundamental 
rights jurisprudence, which would be ensured within the Community's very own 
"structure and objectives." [FN157] To this day there is no clear solution to the built-in 
ambiguity of European fundamental rights. [FN158] The ECJ has long proceeded in the 
hope that its own views on such issues and those of the member states' legal actors 
would never clash. Recent developments--most noticeably the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights [FN159]—are not expected to assuage, technically [FN160] or even 
symbolically, national worries of encroachment, as expressed by the German 
Constitutional Court in its Maastricht decision. [FN161] 
The sphere of equality is no exception. Equality, in the ECJ's view, is not only a general 
principle of Community law, but also a "fundamental human right" not to be 
discriminated against. [FN162] In enforcing the fundamental right to equal treatment, 
the ECJ has traditionally kept in tune with member states' constitutional guidelines. 
The new E.C. Treaty Article 13, providing the Court with an independent legal basis for 
its adjudication of equality, does not really change the status quo. If non-
discrimination were to take a form of its own in E.C. law, substantially diverging from 
member states' understanding of equality, the reasoning behind the Maastricht 
decision might lead to constitutional disobedience. [FN163] In dealing with issues of 
equal protection and relegating positive action to the status of "derogation," the ECJ 
cannot be exclusively self-referential. 
In 1995, when the Court decided Kalanke, its reception of national views took the 
shape of a short, matter-of-fact remark by AG Tesauro: "[T]he principle of equality as 
between individuals ... is safeguarded in most of the member states [sic] legal 
systems." [FN164] To some extent, this perception is still defensible today; but things 
are changing. Because marginalization may be due to social biases against particular 
ethnicities or religions, Europe's profound commitment to social causes may require 
the invocation of "suspect categories" as criteria for the identification of disadvantaged 
groups in order to effect change. [FN165] Targeting groups of pre-defined identity for 
the distribution of social benefits such as subsidized housing, education, and financing 
is a strategy employed, as illustrated below, even in most identity-blind systems. 
These changes make it more difficult for the ECJ to cling to the coherent vision of 
individual equality outlined in the context of gender. The following sections illustrate 
that the law of the member states is much more receptive to groups, identity, and 
ethnicity than what the dominant rhetoric of individual rights may concede. 
B. The "Dilemma of Diversity" in the Member States 
[W]hen does treating people differently emphasize their differences and stigmatize or 
hinder them on that basis? And when does treating people the same become 
insensitive to their differences and likely to stigmatize them on that basis?  
... The problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating members of 
minority groups the same as members of the majority and by treating the two groups 
differently.  
... Governmental neutrality may be the best way to assure equality, yet governmental 
neutrality may also freeze in place the past consequences of differences. [FN166] 
The "dilemma of difference," identified by Martha Minow in the U.S. context, 
characterizes the legal landscape of the E.U. member states. Some governments are 
traditionally at ease with the recognition of ethnicity, religion, or national origin in 
official statistics, [FN167] and even with the practice of explicit affirmative action in 
favor of groups identified by such characteristics. In Northern Ireland, the 1989 Fair 
Employment Act allows the Fair Employment Commission to instruct employers to take 
"hard" affirmative action measures to remedy the underrepresentation of Protestant 
and Roman Catholic communities in the workplace. [FN168] In the Netherlands, some 
forms of affirmative action in the civil service allow preferential hiring of candidates 
having adequate, and not necessarily equal qualifications. [FN169] Sweden, too, has 
occasionally resorted to veritable quotas for ethnic minority members. [ FN170] As 
observed in Part II, these plans would exceed the narrow standards imposed by the 
ECJ upon states' positive action measures. [FN171] 
In other states, for reasons ranging from history to politics and philosophy, the rhetoric 
of individual rights is far more powerful and yields a different official discourse. France, 
for instance, purports an identity-neutral vision of equality, and does not employ overt 
measures of positive or affirmative action in favor of ethnic, racial, or religious groups. 
[FN172] French policies in favor of the disadvantaged are cast in origin- or faith-blind 
terms, and are unlikely to be affected by the ECJ's proportionality scrutiny. Identity-
blind equality is a common paradigm in other E.U. states as well. [FN173] Most 
noticeably, Germany displays a constitutional aversion to affirmative action and to 
group recognition in general, due to the still horrifying memories of German crimes in 
World War II. [FN174] In Germany, however, ethnicity and religion are legally visible, 
and clearly inform a number of traits specific to that legal system. [FN175] In France, 
by contrast, identity blindness is a pervasive feature, epitomized by the lack of official 
statistics on the origin of French citizens and by a firmly secular vision of governance. 
Its model of a color-blind, absolutely neutral law is particularly strong. [FN176] At the 
same time, France is characterized by a remarkably diverse population, and by 
particularly visible political tensions around the issue of multi-ethnicity. The dilemma of 
diversity is therefore especially obvious in the French legal landscape. 
C. The Case of France: Identity Blindness ... 
Article 2 of the 1958 French Constitution assures equality without distinction based on 
origin, race, and religion. [FN177] This provision carries a lot of weight in public 
discourse and is taken at face value. Color- blindness is a fundamental imperative for 
the Republic. The Conseil Constitutionnel does not have to deal with origin and 
ethnicity as suspect categories because they do not surface as definitional criteria in 
French legislation. Gathering demographic information on race, religion, or ethnicity, 
even for census or statistical inquiries, is traditionally prohibited. [FN178] The official 
census uses three categories only: French by birth, French by naturalization, and 
foreign. [FN179] The children of naturalized immigrants belong in the first category, 
which reveals nothing about the national origin of those classified under it. [FN180] 
French is still the only official language. [FN181] Citizenship is still a unitary concept, 
and justice is still affirmed on individual bases. [FN182] 
There are several reasons for this attitude. The most emotionally charged is the 
memory of the Vichy period, during which individuals experienced the denial of basic 
rights due to their religious or group affiliation. Second, the acknowledgment of 
different groups of citizens within the French territory would threaten the very 
existence of the Republic, which, according to the Constitution, is and must remain a 
unitary state. A third reason lies in the historical strength of egalitarian slogans. 
Equality (across social classes rather than ethnicities or nationalities) was the 
philosophical and political engine behind the French Revolution, and is still perceived as 
the ideological building block of the nation. Until recently, French diplomats would deny 
the very existence of minorities in France. [FN183] 
Rooted as it is in the unity of metaphysical reason, modern France is at odds 
historically with the diverse logics of multiculturalism. The French-Republican model of 
citizenship differs from the German because the French model is not traditionally 
centered on ethnicity. It is based, instead, on a shared allegiance to a hard core of 
civic values, allegedly grounded upon the time- honored Declaration des droits de 
l'homme et du citoyen, [FN184] observed up to this day with some dark interruptions. 
Immigrants have relatively easy access to naturalization, and in any case their children 
are granted citizenship jure soli. With citizenship comes equality, both formally and in 
the substance of social benefits. The system is equipped with aggressive anti- 
discrimination laws reinforced by criminal sanctions, [FN185] but it leaves no room for 
positive action plans. [FN186] 
The policy adopted by the Haut Conseil à l'Integration is referred to as creuset 
français--a gallicism for melting pot. [FN187] Because right- wing politicians have 
often resorted to multicultural discourse to express essentially xenophobic views, the 
overt identification of minorities in legislative and administrative policies may be 
politically unpalatable. [FN188] Anti-discrimination provisions are pervasive in their 
application. Not even private, nonprofit associations may discriminate on the basis of 
nationality in selecting the beneficiaries of their charitable activities: material aid, if 
given, is to be for all those in need. [FN189] 
The discussion of poverty in mainstream law journals, reflecting the law and practice of 
French census-taking, makes no reference to minorities, even though the "neutral" 
terms étrangers and exclusion are highlighted as special entries in the tables of 
contents. [FN190] A survey conducted in the year 2000 by the National Observatory of 
Poverty and Social Exclusion, meant to measure the availability of rights for 
"populations in difficulty," was intentionally run without any reference to nationality or 
ethnicity. [FN191] One must read between the lines of the Observatory's report to find 
an oblique reference to non-French speaking minorities: those who have difficulty 
reading and writing, the inquiry reveals, have by far the hardest time accessing 
information on their legal entitlements. At the same time, they are just about the last 
ones to complain about it. [FN192] 
D. ... and Identity-Based Redistribution 
Stepping down to the level of municipalities, one may find a different picture: ethnicity 
and nationality do indeed feature in town and district regulations, taking many forms 
and occasionally palatable disguises. There is, of course, no possibility of gathering 
data on residents' origin. However, French statistics allow for distinctions between 
citizens and foreigners, and decentralized authorities may make use of such categories 
if needed. The demographics of a city, for instance, are intuitively essential to any 
sensible strategy of local government, no matter how opposed the mayor may be to 
multicultural ideals. Identifying given pockets of ethnicity within large and 
sociologically complex cities is crucial to urban planning. Due to the indisputable fact of 
late arrival and, more arguably, to socioeconomic discrimination, minority groups are 
on average less wealthy than local nationals. Urban development, if left to blind 
market forces, drives minorities together toward low-income areas, where segregation 
is a probable result. Ghettos are likely targets of racist mobilization as well as 
conceptual nightmares for assimilation theorists. [FN193] When the stated goal of 
urban planning is the prevention of ghettos, it may be helpful to distinguish between 
foreigners and French citizens, and make sure that both groups receive quotas of 
subsidized housing. [FN194] 
The distinction between citizens and foreigners has other applications in local 
government. When a much higher than average percentage of a school district's 
student body consists of children of foreigners, the district can be identified as ZEP 
(Zone d'Education Prioritaire) and provided with additional attention. [FN195] The 
name of the game is always identity-blind assistance to those in need. Yet the 
redistribution of public resources is essentially channeled along group-based lines. 
To be sure, distinctions between citizens and foreigners are still perceived as identity-
blind in France. [FN196] Given the embracing character of French citizenship law, 
which allows for generous naturalization of ethnic minorities, citizenship per se escapes 
the label of suspect category in the framework of equality. It can be put to use in 
demographic planning, and quite effectively at that, because French citizens are more 
likely to be of French descent. 
The next step for social planners is to attempt a distinction among French citizens. This 
time it may be harder not to pierce the veil of neutrality. Yet one finds specific social 
and economic intervention in favor of the category of "French citizens from overseas." 
[FN197] And as it happens, in the overseas territories of the Republic virtually no one 
is of exclusively French origin. 
The initiatives of the Fonds d'Action Sociale are most explicitly addressed to the 
protection and advancement of given minorities. [FN198] This governmental institute 
for the integration of immigrants earmarks some of its funds for intercultural studies 
and projects related to the cultures of immigrants (mainly African and Asian). [FN199] 
From the government's viewpoint, funds are distributed to private associations, rather 
than to a given minority determined to affirm its own collective identity. The unitary 
character of citizenship and the individual basis of entitlements remain formally 
unquestioned. [FN200] The fact is, though, that the picture is slowly changing. 
According to traditional French politics, the state's commitment to the ideal of 
fraternité would progressively take care of the socioeconomic marginalization of 
newcomers. Even in scholarly works most sensitive to multiculturalism in 
contemporary France, one can find traces of this vision: "[T]he ethnic problem in 
France is not cultural, linguistic, or political, but mostly socioeconomic." [FN201] The 
"headscarf problem," which emerged in the late 1980s, has revealed the fragility of 
this construct. 
All over France, Muslim girls began attending school wearing headscarves, raising the 
specter of Islamic fundamentalism. [FN202] Schoolmasters, occasionally backed up by 
no less than the Minister of Education, would then keep them out of school for the sake 
of secularism in education. The country split between outright defenders of republican 
laicism and fans of postmodern tolerance. At first the Conseil d'État declined the 
government's request for policy guidelines, leaving the whole matter to the discretion 
of schoolmasters. [FN203] But since 1996, the Conseil's answer has been consistent: 
veiled girls must be allowed in the classroom, insofar as their dressing and posture are 
not provocative or proselytizing. [FN204] The problem, however, is far from being 
resolved. School teachers, committed by law to secularism in the classroom, are faced 
with growing demand for religious expression, including suspended attendance 
throughout the Ramadan period, scarves, and other "ostentatious signs of belonging." 
[FN205] It is harder and harder for schools to live with the assumption that all children 
are equal, and that the problems of immigrant peoples can be reduced to an economic 
dimension. [FN206] Immigrants' demand for cultural affirmation is growing. The 
definitions of immigrant identities become ever more diverse, at times conflicting, and 
ever more resilient to assimilation in the name of blind justice. The individual freedoms 
of religion and expression do not point to viable solutions. 
Most importantly, cultural or religious recognition may result in a group-based 
reallocation of resources. Schools have begun to provide children of immigrants with 
courses about their respective languages and cultures of origin. [FN207] Such school 
initiatives did not materialize after a grant of enforceable collective rights on the basis 
of nationality, religion, or ethnicity. The language of positive action was not implicated. 
Identity-based benefits stem from discretionary use of public resources, often 
prompted by negotiations between local authorities and representatives of immigrants' 
associations. [FN208] Not even France can avoid the dilemma of striking ad-hoc 
balances between individual equality, neutrality, and collective identity. 
E. Identity-Based Redistribution at the Crossroads of Welfare and Culture 
The policies and administrative practices identified in the previous section are the 
product of mixed concerns for both the cultural identity and the social welfare of 
marginalized communities. Interestingly, however, "the cultural" and "the social" are 
two very separate strands in the contemporary legal discourse on minorities. Indeed, 
they are often conceived of as opposites. As noted earlier, redistributive policies in the 
French system are not openly oriented toward minorities. Riva Kastoryano explains 
that "[i]n discourse, 'less' is determined economically, like social handicaps. The state 
does not take account a priori of the national or religious origin of families but refers to 
all economically disadvantaged families." [FN209] A clear echo of this discourse can be 
found at the E.U. level, where the allegedly clean separation between cultural identity 
and socioeconomic need is used to delimit the competencies of E.U. institutions. 
[FN210] 
The Union's cultural policy, based on E.C. Treaty Article 151, addresses self-identified 
communities striving for recognition and survival in the face of assimilating pressure. It 
mainly uses the vocabulary of identity and values. Article 151 is used to explore the 
desirability of a distinct set of legal tools, meant to allow group members to keep their 
identity alive, while maintaining their political affiliation with a larger civic constituency. 
Within this dimension, states' decision-makers discuss the plausibility of such things as 
allocation of municipal resources for cultural events, allowance of multicultural 
representation in the media, accommodation of religious preferences with respect to 
holidays or dress code in the workplace or in schools, protection of language as an 
expression of values and cohesion, and so on. In the E.C. Treaty, culture is the subject 
of an article of its own. [FN211] The Commission's Directorate General for Education 
and Culture deals with matters of "cultural heritage," paying no regard to the 
socioeconomic marginalization of some of the cultural communities that it identifies 
and helps. [FN212] 
Welfare discourse, on the other hand, pertains to the socioeconomic rehabilitation of 
recent immigrants, starting from the assumption that, on average, they face greater 
economic challenges. The terms of reference here are access to instruction, 
employment, social benefits, housing, and financing. Cultural identity is not a 
traditional feature of this discourse. Welfare for an underprivileged group can be 
conceived of as a neutral project, which identifies addressees on the basis of income 
rather than belonging. 
Welfare, as opposed to multicultural policies, is still the most common European 
response to marginalization. Constitutional history supports this choice. The French 
Revolution was inspired by motives of economic redistribution. Equality was born to 
French life out of class conflict, and was then taken to imply, in its Rousseauvian 
version, the systemic correction of extreme inequality of wealth and power. [FN213] In 
the constitutional legacy of Continental Europe, there is a strong imperative to 
intervene in social matters and to reach out, by law, to the economic fringes of society. 
The Continental focus on social justice makes the recognition of multiple identities 
seem, in many circles, not just undesirable and politically divisive, but fundamentally 
unnecessary. Against this background, the American sensitivity to claims of identity 
and recognition is often dismissed as the unfortunate by-product of the shortcomings 
of the U.S. welfare system. [FN214] 
It is according to this set of tenets that culture and welfare come across as totally 
separate concepts, the former relegated to rather airy matters and cast in non-political 
discourse, the latter addressing the materiality of redistribution.In practice, as noted, 
the two spheres are converging. When the experience of economic marginalization 
overlaps with minority status (as in the overcrowded ghettos of large urban centers in 
Europe) identity, coinciding with common cultural heritage, is a fundamental variable 
in the welfare equation. Programs like state-funded religious schools, use of alternative 
languages in legal or political fora, and subsidized second- language instruction for 
first- or second-generation immigrants, are at the same time an homage to cultural 
diversity and also stepping stools for the economic betterment of the excluded. As 
observed, both the Union and its members engage in action of this hybrid sort. The 
culture-versus-welfare dichotomy becomes descriptively inaccurate as it fails to 
account for numerous policies that clearly fall in between. When culture defines and 
inspires redistributive policies, welfare is no longer identity-blind. 
F. Bridging Identity and Welfare in the Union: The Project of Social Inclusion 
In recent years, the E.U. discourse on poverty has been significantly modified. [FN215] 
The E.C. Treaty, in its latest version, contemplates the category of "social exclusion." 
[FN216] In this field, Community institutions have no power of harmonization. State 
action can be the subject of supranational coordination efforts and incentive measures, 
but not of substantial scrutiny before the ECJ. [FN217] Social exclusion adds much 
nuance to poverty discourse. [FN218] It recognizes, in the treaty itself, a special 
dimension of poverty--one coinciding with a social condition of marginalization, and 
therefore difficult to eradicate. The Union has already indicated that the fight against 
social exclusion must now be conducted with special attention to phenomena of 
collective marginalization: "setting appropriate objectives should also involve ... 
developing priority actions in favour of specific target groups (for example, minorities 
...), with Member States choosing amongst those actions according to their particular 
situations." [FN219] Community guidelines cannot and do not obligate states to 
identify "suspect categories" in their poverty programs, [FN220] but encourage them 
to design their social policies with more precise target groups in mind. [FN221] 
This discursive development makes group identity not only visible but also directly 
connected to welfare intervention. Affirmative action in favor of marginalized groups 
lies exactly in this connection. Awareness of social exclusion as a particularly thorny 
dimension of poverty is crucial not only in terms of substantive justice, but also for the 
correct categorization and channeling of many instruments of social intervention, 
exceeding the scope of equality review before the ECJ. The fight against social 
exclusion begins with enhanced enforcement of non-discrimination laws at both the 
national and supranational levels. But it continues, and moves deeper and further, with 
state policies now unmistakably characterized by awareness of collective identities. The 
following Part focuses on technical problems of coordination between these two levels 
of intervention. 
V. POSITIVE ACTION BETWEEN EQUALITY PARADIGMS AND REDISTRIBUTIVE 
POLITICS 
The opening Part of this Article introduced the argument that the ECJ should not 
review positive action policies enacted by member states. In the course of Parts III and 
IV, that argument gained nuance. The form of judicial restraint advocated here does 
not imply the overall withdrawal of the Court from its settled case law on equality. As 
observed, the enforcement of nondiscrimination provisions at a supranational, as well 
as national, level remains a major tool for the social inclusion of marginalized groups in 
Europe. [FN222] *376 The Court, however, should decline to hear a different sort of 
complaint--that of traditionally non-discriminated majorities, determined to offset 
positive action policies that a national system, through the complexity of its own 
politics and through its own constitutional filter, has come to approve. [FN223] 
This Part provides technical support for this argument, and illustrates how the Court 
has been capable of similar forms of judicial restraint in other politically sensitive 
areas. Furthermore, the several prohibitions against discrimination in the E.C. Treaty 
may not be an adequate match for the complex theme of positive action. As observed 
in Part IV, other treaty provisions, addressing the problem of social exclusion, deal 
more directly with issues of redistribution and are better suited to capture the true 
nature of affirmative action plans. These provisions, rather than relying on E.U. rights 
and ECJ enforcement, leave ample room for state autonomy, and open up alternative 
avenues for the rehabilitation of marginalized collective identities throughout the 
Union. 
This argument needs further elaboration. The coordination of supranational equality 
paradigms with new, softer tools of social inclusion raises a number of potential 
problems, ranging from weakened enforcement of individual rights to uncertain 
legitimacy of Community action. These problems, currently in the spotlight of European 
debates on constitutionalism, are examined here through the lens of affirmative action, 
which adds focus and point to the discussion. 
A. The Case for Supranational Restraint in the Judicial Review of Positive 
Action 
In light of the progressive constitutionalization of fundamental rights in the E.U. legal 
system, some scholars see it as imperative for the Court to take a higher, more 
activist, profile in human rights judicial review. [FN224] Others encourage the ECJ to 
improve the quality of its discourse in matters of fundamental rights, so as to bolster 
its credibility and legitimacy on such issues. [FN225] The Court, the argument goes, 
should actively solicit input from member states to get a better sense of their 
constitutional traditions in context. The Court should also rely on the comparative work 
of its own research and documentation center, and make such work available to 
member states to intensify communication among national actors. [FN226] These 
arguments aim at bolstering the ECJ's substantive--if not formal--legitimacy and at 
extending the scope of its human rights scrutiny. 
The argument for judicial restraint, elaborated in this Article, is not in conflict with 
these views. In the present political context, the goal of removing discrimination by 
means of rights- or equality-based review is far from being achieved. There is no doubt 
that the Court can still contribute to the social inclusion of marginalized groups by 
enforcing equality in individual cases. The non-discrimination clauses contained in 
Community association agreements with certain third countries are still forcing 
reluctant E.U. members to extend benefits to immigrant labor. [FN227] The equality 
provisions of the E.C. Treaty, providing the basis for future judicial review of new 
members' legislation after the imminent round of E.U. enlargement, are likely to 
prompt similarly meaningful holdings. [FN228] The European Union's heightened 
commitment to the promotion of fundamental rights requires further enactment of 
human rights policies in Brussels. [FN229] The ECJ, in turn, must continue to 
guarantee the non-discriminatory enforcement of individual rights and extend its reach 
to encompass new social and economic rights as soon as they gain binding 
supranational force. [FN230] The traditional form of equality review, with the 
formidable power of its rhetoric, can still do good work for victims of racial, ethnic, or 
religious bias. 
The ECJ's enforcement of equal and individual rights, however, runs out of pragmatist 
steam in matters of positive discrimination. When member states, in the sovereign 
exercise of their redistributive functions, deem it appropriate and legitimate to confer 
benefits to identity-defined groups, the Court should suspend its supranational scrutiny 
and respect the regulatory choices of the member states. This course of judicial action 
would find support in an authoritative line of precedents. 
B. Positive Action à la Keck 
There is a fundamental connection between the "economic constitution" of the Union 
and the general principle of equality. [FN231] To this day, the enforcement of non-
discrimination still uses the language and the framework for judicial review developed 
by the ECJ in economic matters. [FN232] That connection is worthy of further analysis 
in the specific context of positive action. 
To promote the integration of the Common Market over the course of the past three 
decades, the ECJ has enforced the EEC Treaty's "commerce clause" of Article 30 (now 
E.C. Treaty Article 28) along the following evolutionary lines. [FN233] With the path-
breaking Dassonville decision, the Court stated clearly that it would not tolerate any 
form of national regulation discriminating against other member states' goods. 
[FN234] As to non-discriminatory regulation formally affecting local and foreign goods 
in an identical fashion, Dassonville and the later Cassis de Dijon holding outlined the 
Court's own rule of reason: [FN235] if such regulation had in any way the effect of 
hindering interstate trade, it would have to be justified in light of "mandatory 
requirements" of the regulating state. Further, the means for the realization of such 
interests would have to prove proportionate and necessary, or narrowly tailored, to the 
regulation's ends. For many years, this test allowed the ECJ to strike down many forms 
of state regulation as incompatible with the Treaty of Rome. [FN236] Such holdings 
resulted, to varying degrees, in the disempowerment of local governments. [FN237] 
The ensuing normative vacuum would at times, but not always, be filled by Community 
regulation. 
By the late 1980s, the Court's proportionality review seemed to have acquired a life of 
its own, to the point of exceeding its original design. Traders began to show an 
"increasing tendency ... to invoke Article 30 of the Treaty as a means of challenging 
any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules were 
not aimed at products from other member States." [FN238] In Quietlynn, for instance, 
British merchants tried to dismantle the license system imposed upon retailers of sex 
articles by claiming that the license requirement reduced the volume of sales of 
imported "goods." [FN239] The Court's review, requiring a judicial reassessment of the 
very worth of states' regulatory intervention, proved particularly intrusive upon 
national policies. 
At that point, the Court began to show signs of discomfort in the application of its own 
test. It continued to review the legitimacy of states' goals allegedly justifying their 
restrictive measures. But, on a few occasions, it dropped the ultimate burden of 
ideologically charged inquiries into the lap of national courts, by letting the states 
themselves determine whether the measures in question were proportionate to such 
goals. [FN240] 
Then the judicial discourse changed. In the famous Keck decision, [FN241] a French 
regulation preventing retailers from selling goods below their actual purchase price was 
challenged by retailers who argued that the regulation hindered interstate trade by 
reducing the volume of French sales of imported products. The Court might have, once 
more, looked for legitimate state interests justifying the prohibition against sales below 
cost, and applied in full a Cassis analysis. Instead, distancing itself from its own settled 
case law, the Court declined to review the challenged measure. [FN242] The case 
rested upon a fine distinction: rules relating to the goods themselves (e.g., packaging 
or labeling requirements) would indeed fall under the Cassis doctrine and require full 
scrutiny. By contrast, the rule challenged in Keck (no sale below cost) was no more 
than a neutral "selling arrangement," or modality of sale--allegedly a totally different 
category of regulatory intervention. Insofar as they were non-discriminatory, state-
mandated selling arrangements would fall outside the scope of Article 30. In other 
words, they would not be reviewed at all. 
The doctrinal framework of the Keck holding was not watertight. Its theoretical balance 
was unsteady. The distinction upon which the decision relied was certainly problematic, 
and has proved difficult to define in later cases. [FN243] 
Nonetheless, prominent scholars hailed Keck as a long overdue confinement of Article 
30 to its own proper realm: the elimination of all forms of de facto protectionism by 
state regulation. In the words of Joseph Weiler, Keck indicated a "willingness on the 
part of the court openly to acknowledge that its judicial doctrines are rooted in a 
sociopolitical and economic reality that changes with time and which calls for revision 
even of the most hallowed canons." [FN244] The hallowed canon in need of revision 
here was the idea that any hindrance whatsoever of interstate trade would create 
impermissible obstacles to the thorough economic integration of Europe. Any form of 
state regulation--even a rule relating to selling arrangements--is always cause for 
trade diversion or contraction. However, the rules in Keck did not offset the principle of 
non-discrimination of products on the basis of their origin. They applied to imported 
and local products equally, in law and in fact. National protectionism was certainly not 
at stake. The Court concluded, therefore, that such rules would be compatible with the 
logic of the Common Market and properly left them to the regulatory vision of national 
authorities. The "no hindrance" pillar of economic integration did not crumble. It was 
relieved of architectural burdens that it no longer needed to carry. 
The change advocated in this Article in matters of positive action--an attitude of 
judicial restraint, in deference to localism--would rest on firmer ground than the Keck 
retreat, and would bear strong analogies to that judicial move. This change would also 
prompt the revision (but not the crumbling) of hallowed canons, and relieve the E.U. 
principle of equality from the burden of local choices that it is not meant to bear. As in 
Keck, the prohibition against discrimination would stay the same, in the sense that 
minority groups and each of their members would remain protected from biased 
pejorative treatment, and would continue to rely on the ultimate guarantee of review 
by the ECJ. At the same time, the Court would hold back when faced with challenges to 
national policies, designed to help marginalized minorities, that have already been 
vetted by state-level constitutional devices. 
C. The Question of Individual Rights 
The Union is faced with demands for a higher degree of consistency in the definition of 
its core values. All its institutions, and in particular the Court of Justice, are hard 
pressed to prove their commitment to the rule of law, and to its corollary of equality. 
[FN245] The ECJ must be guided by a comprehensive view of justice, and guarantee 
that E.U. policies, even when delegated to the member states for implementation, 
never come to clash with fundamental rights, both equal and individual. In a system 
based on the rule of law, judicial review is the promise that rights will be enforced. 
[FN246] The argument for the contraction of the ECJ's scrutiny in matters of 
affirmative action must therefore grapple with the question of fundamental rights in 
E.C. law. 
In matters of gender preferences, the ECJ has so far striven to guarantee the 
individual rights of those outside the privileged group. This has proven to be the 
stumbling block of such affirmative schemes as the one at the root of the Abrahamsson 
litigation. The contraction of ECJ review in matters of positive action would imply a net 
loss in terms of judicial remedies. Mr. Marschall, Mr. Anderson, and Mr. Griesmar--the 
three men who fell victims to positive action schemes in the Marschall, Abrahamsson, 
and Griesmar cases respectively--would have more limited recourse to E.C. justice 
were their complaints directed against racial, religious, or ethnic forms of preferential 
treatment. To be sure, these complaints would not fall in a legal vacuum. National 
systems would not cease to provide time-honored mechanisms of review, and positive 
action would still be confined within whatever boundaries national laws have 
established. But in the framework of traditional E.U. constitutionalism, the suspension 
of supranational equality scrutiny in such cases would still pose a doctrinal puzzle. 
[FN247] 
The limited nature of E.C. competencies, as already discussed, provides a way out of, if 
not a solution to, the puzzle. If identity-based positive action is understood to be a 
legitimate tool for the national fight against social exclusion, the lack of supranational 
judicial review follows naturally from the limits of classic European constitutionalism. 
This conceptual framework does not, of course, resolve the difficult task of drawing the 
line between individual-rights protection on the one hand, and aid to those collectively 
excluded on the other. As indicated by the post-Keck line of ECJ cases, distinguishing 
between the scope of supranational equality and states' redistributive policies may not 
be easy. But the stakes of positive action are sufficiently high and politically sensitive 
to require careful reflection on the proper limits of supranationalism. National 
governments still retain most regulatory powers in social matters. The case-by-case 
definition of the wavering line separating the hard core of individual rights from the 
soft periphery of collective entitlements endorsed by political consensus is still best left 
in states' hands. 
D. Social Inclusion and the New Forms of Governance 
Further tensions within the traditional paradigm of E.U. constitutionalism arise from the 
new procedural handling of social matters envisaged by the E.C. Treaty. In matters of 
social policy the Classic Community Method does not entirely apply. A major CCM 
condition--a theoretically clean and judicially enforceable division of competencies 
between the European Community and the states--is muddied here. Member states' 
control over their respective socioeconomic policies is not only limited by the classic 
logic of free trade, [FN248] or by the straightjacket of macroeconomic targets imposed 
by monetary union. [FN249] Sovereignty is also softened at the margins by an 
intrusive set of incentive, coordination, and review mechanisms arranged by 
Community institutions. 
The subject of social exclusion--crucial, as we have seen, to the theory and practice of 
affirmative action in Europe--partakes of this hybrid form of governance. The E.C. 
Treaty now extends to the fight against social exclusion a particular technique, the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC), applied so far only in limited areas of economic 
and employment policy. [FN250] The OMC provides a non-binding mechanism for the 
coordination of member states' policies. The Council sets common objectives, but such 
objectives are to be reached by means of independently drafted national action plans 
(NAPs). [FN251] The Commission, in turn, has the role of promoting comparisons 
among different state practices, and coordinating national action. The Treaty grants 
formal advisory status to a Social Protection Committee, meant to provide a stable 
channel of communication between the Commission and member states in social 
matters. [FN252] Member states still retain a high degree of autonomy and flexibility. 
[FN253] 
Themes as delicate as the experimentation of formulae for the coexistence of diverse 
identities and for reaching out to marginalized groups find adequate reception within 
this structure of governance. However, the OMC leaves no room for immediately 
countering national policies running astray of the Commission's guidelines. Nor does it 
provide supranational judicial remedies for those individuals arguably ignored or 
penalized by state policies. The question is whether the ECJ can maintain the solidity of 
its institutional role, while keeping a looser supranational grip on the social aspects of 
E.U. governance. The answer to this question is complex and requires careful 
articulation. 
E. Positive Action, Social Inclusion, and Supranational Rights Enforcement 
The theme pervading most of the examples above is redistribution of public resources. 
Redistribution, or distributive justice, is only marginally implicated by justiciable E.C. 
rights. "Social rights" do exist at a supranational level, but at present they do not 
define the ultimate content of welfare choices implemented nationally or sub-nationally 
throughout the Union. [FN254] As explored in Parts III and IV above, the current 
model combines a core of justiciable E.C. social rights with a set of entitlements that 
exceed the scope of supranational judicial review. These entitlements, in turn, consist 
of a combination of social rights granted by national laws and a mix of supranational, 
state-based, or sub-national policies that do not give rise to judicial claims, and 
materialize within the realm of political action or discretionary, decentralized 
redistribution. [FN255] 
Against this mixed background, the role for supranational law in welfare matters 
remains central in both form and substance. In terms of substance, the ECJ can ensure 
that members of minority groups receive (at least) as good a package of social benefits 
as anyone else in any given state. Moreover, enforceable E.C. law can guarantee the 
achievement of minimum common goals throughout the Union, and ensure the 
justiciability of core social claims. The Union is currently in the process of articulating 
its social conscience and bringing to the fore the redistributive streak of its economic 
agenda. [FN256] Justiciable E.C. rights reflect the current degree of consensus that the 
supranational forum can provide in matters of welfare benefits for workers and citizens 
in general. [FN257] If, when, and to what extent the package of social rights, as 
defined in the E.U. Charter, becomes enforceable, the substantive role of the European 
courts in this respect will be all the more important. [FN258] But it is clear, at present, 
that this core does not define the upper limits of locally designed social measures. 
In terms of form, supranational law can supply necessary procedural guarantees for 
the implementation of new ways of governance. [FN259] By providing process review 
on these matters, the European courts can supervise the distribution of responsibilities 
among states and E.U. institutions as partners in decision-making, with the goal of 
promoting the democracy and transparency of new governance mechanisms. [FN260] 
At this level too, the judicial scrutiny of the European courts remains important. 
[FN261] 
For the rest, substantive supranational review must yield to a "heightened reliance on 
national democratic credentials." [FN262] In a thoughtful commentary, Oliver 
Gerstenberg highlights the compatibility of the OMC with the logic of a rule-of-law-
based system and with the need to provide a forum for individual dissenters' 
complaints:  
If a State is subject to a critical recommendation for breach of policy guidelines, 
deliberate non-compliance may rather be a response to the ambiguity of the guidelines 
themselves and may be re-interpreted as a move in an argumentative game, in which 
new facts--perceptions of situation, need and interest--are being fed into the rolling 
process of (re-) defining the guidelines themselves. Conversely, dissenters within a 
non-complying State may draw on the pool of arguments underlying an EU-guideline in 
order to re- ignite a debate on their Member State's policy orientation--and in doing so 
contribute to the emergence of a European public sphere. The OMC stresses, on the 
one hand, the importance of diversity and context- sensitivity at the national level ... 
and, on the other hand, the importance of ... a search for a common approach .... 
[FN263] 
This view of the OMC might be overly optimistic, given its faith in the outcome of 
participatory political processes. However, it offers a plausible avenue for diverse legal 
and political choices in matters of positive action and identity-based redistribution in 
the Union. 
Alternatively, one might conceive of a substantive, rather than merely procedural, 
juridification of soft governance. Adding "equality" to the conditions that OMC 
outcomes must satisfy--along the lines of recent scholarly suggestions [FN264]--would 
once more provide the ECJ with Abrahamsson-like review powers. While more in line 
with traditional constitutionalism, this choice would produce the undesirable effect of 
limiting the range of states' tools against social exclusion. [FN265] In this light, 
subjecting the OMC to substantive constraints may stifle, rather than enhance, the 
democratic credentials of European constitutionalism. [FN266] 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Identity-based redistribution, as it materializes through positive action schemes, 
belongs on the list of those welfare devices around which, at present, the Classic 
Community Method is not likely to yield consensus. [FN267] The widely different 
perceptions of multiculturalism in the several member states are certain to become 
even more diverse in the wake of the enlargement of the European Union. [FN268] 
Given the panoply of current arrangements and the multiplicity of political and 
scholarly proposals on such matters, national and sub-national governments are bound 
to diverge significantly in their choices of legal or political tools for rehabilitating 
marginalized groups. Some will resort to legal entitlements reinforced by judicial 
protection. Others will boost the political mobilization of minorities without juridifying 
their claims. [FN269] Others still will devise complex blends of legal and political 
mechanisms for targeting identity-based marginalization. Along the spectrum of 
decentralization, some will let municipalities take charge of decision-making in this 
respect. Others will cling to uniform national policies. Others still will foster 
transnational solutions. [FN270] The field is clearly one of "politically salient diversity," 
[FN271] which cannot be reduced to univocal formulae for centralized judicial review. 
[FN272] 
A caveat applies here with vigor. Things might change upon achievement of a further 
stage of integration, with a bulky set of enforceable E.C. social rights, a thoroughly 
harmonized immigration policy, and a deeper degree of consensus on the meaning and 
value of multicultural diversity. With thicker demos and clearer telos, [FN273] the 
jurisdiction of the European courts might go well beyond the task of setting floor-levels 
of social protection, and move on to the design of ceilings. At a much different stage of 
integration, the ECJ might plausibly engage in judicial scrutiny of positive action. At 
that point, we would have to worry about striking a new balance between localism and 
decentralization. [FN274] At that point, we might want to converge toward one 
uniform understanding of social justice, or toward one coherent vision of welfare and 
equality to be ultimately endorsed and protected by one court. At that point, we might 
want to focus on how to improve the dialogue between the ECJ and the Union's 
periphery, or look at federal experiences in other states for inspiration on how to deal 
with diversity. But that is another story. 
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